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The apparent link between miscarriages of justice in prosecutions involving expert 
evidence and the level of training provided to the legal profession (the Bar in 
particular) and the Judiciary in respect of such evidence was highlighted in 2005 with 
the publication of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 
Report ‘Expert Evidence on Trial’2.  The Law Commission, in the 2011 Report ‘Expert 
Evidence in England and Wales’3 subsequently comprehensively addressed the same 
issue. This article seeks to consider why appropriate training in relation to expert 
evidence is so necessary and questions whether, in the context of the amendments 
to what is now Part 19 of the Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR19) and Part 19A of 
the Criminal Practice Direction (CrimPD19A), there have been sufficient 
developments in training to effect a cultural change within the legal profession and 
ultimately substantially reduce the risk of future miscarriages of justice.  Finally the 
article debates the nature of required training, arguing that much more detailed 
                                                        
1 We should like to thank Professor Tim Wilson and Dr Michael Stockdale, Northumbria Centre 
for Evidence and Criminal Justice Studies for their assistance with earlier drafts of this article.  
2 Science and Technology Committee Forensic Science on Trial, Session 2004–2005, HC 96-1. 
3 Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales,Cm 325, 
(2011) 
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training is required than has previously been considered and addresses where this 





The assumption that the traditional adversarial safeguards of challenge by cross-
examination, the adduction of contrary expert evidence, and directions by the trial 
judge were sufficient to prevent miscarriages of justice in cases where unreliable 
expert evidence was admitted was doubted by the Law Commission 4  The 
Commission recommended, alongside the introduction of a statutory admissibility 
test incorporating a reliability limb, an enhanced training regime for the Bar and the 
Judiciary.5 Whilst the Commission’s Report persuaded the Government of the need 
to act, they were not persuaded that a statutory approach was cost effective. As a 
‘novel’6 alternative approach amendments were made to what is now CrimPR19 
(then CrimRP33) and CrimPD19A (then CrimPD33A) was introduced. The intention is 
to ensure that judges are provided at an early stage with more information about 
the expert evidence proposed to be adduced with the potential to “…. increase the 
likelihood of the trial judge and the opposing party, where appropriate, challenging 
expert evidence”.7  The authors doubt whether this greater, and earlier, engagement 
with the issues relevant to the reliability, and therefore admissibility, of expert 
evidence has actually occurred, considers the relevance of training in achieving this 
aim, and the most appropriate form and timing of such training. In particular, the 
article argues that training must be introduced at a much earlier stage than currently 
envisaged if there is to be a cultural shift within the profession that empowers 
members of the Bar and Judiciary to feel confident to challenge expert evidence 
                                                        
4ibid at 1.20  
5 ibid. at 1.43  
6 Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (2014) The future of forensic science in criminal trials: 2014 
Criminal Bar Association Kalisher Lecture at [2] < http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp- 
content/uploads/2014/10/kalisher-lecture-expert-evidence-oct-14.pdf > accessed 21st August 
2016. 
7 Ministry of Justice (2013) The Government's response to the Law Commission Report: Expert 
evidence in criminal proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com No 325) at [4]. < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/260369/govt
-resp-experts-evidence.pdf  > accessed 22nd August 2016 
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where appropriate and that much more detailed training than is currently being 
considered is required if practitioners are to be able to use the CrimPD19A.5 and 
CrimPD19A.6 criteria effectively. 
 
 
The Origins of Reform  
 
In its Report, Forensic Science on Trial, the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee expressed concern at the lack of safeguards to prevent 
miscarriages of justice in cases involving expert evidence, including the lack of 
mandatory training for the Bar and the Judiciary8 and the and the ‘complacency of 
the legal profession in regard to these matters’. 9 10  Specific reference was made to 
the well-publicised cases of Sally Clark11 and Angela Cannings12. Both women were 
convicted of murdering their infant children in cases based heavily upon expert 
evidence. Both were acquitted on appeal.  
 
In the case of Sally Clark there were 2 substantive issues. The first was the non-
disclosure of records of post-mortem microbiological tests in respect of one child. 
The second was the nature of the statistical evidence given to the jury by one of the 
experts relied upon by the prosecution, Professor Roy Meadow (Emeritus Professor 
of Paediatrics and Child Health). Professor Meadow was permitted to give (without 
objection from the defence) misleading evidence that the likelihood of 2 instances of 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome within the same family was 1 in 73 million. According 
to the Court of Appeal this was very likely to grossly overstate the case.13  The court 
also criticised the inappropriate manner in which Professor Meadow had been 
permitted to present the statistical evidence. He referred to the chances of 2 
                                                        
8 See House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, above n. 2 at 177 - 182 
9 Above n. 2 at 189 
10 For a discussion of the role of the advocate in adducing expert evidence see David S. Caudill, 
“Advocacy, witnesses, and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge: Is There an Ethical Duty to 
Evaluate Your Expert’s Testimony” (2002) 39 Idaho L. Rev. 341  
11 R v Clark (Sally) (2003), EWCA Crim 1020 
12 R v Cannings (Angela) (2004) EWCA Crim 1 
13 See R v Clark above, n. 13 at 178 
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instances of sudden infant death syndrome within the same family as equating to 
the chances of backing four 80 to 1 winners of the Grand National in successive 
years.    
The Court of Appeal stated: 
 
“We are quite sure that the evidence should never have been before the jury 
in the way that it was when they considered their verdicts. If there had been 
a challenge to the admissibility of the evidence we would have thought that 
the wisest course would have been to exclude it altogether.”14  
 
The Science and Technology Committee commented that whilst much was made in 
the press of the expert’s failings in this case “little attention was given, at least in 
public, to the lawyers and judges involved, who may have been able to prevent the 
miscarriage of justice from being carried out, but failed to do so.”15  
 
Alongside their recommendation of a ‘gate-keeping’ test for expert evidence, 
developed in partnership with judges, scientists and other key players in the criminal 
justice system – based upon the US Daubert test,16 the Report also addressed, at 
length, the nature of training for the legal profession in respect of expert evidence.  
It expressed ‘great concern’ at the lack of mandatory training for lawyers in respect 
of expert evidence17 and noted that the legal profession appeared largely to believe 
that the nature of the adversarial system offers sufficient effective opportunities for 
the testing of expert evidence.  
 
Direct reference was made to evidence received from The Bar Council:  
 
“Scrutiny takes place because the adversarial system provides for the 
independent challenge of the prosecution view. This is an important 
                                                        
14 Above, n. 11 at 177 
15 Above n. 2 at 169 
16 Above, n. 2 at 55 
17 Above, n. 2 at 180 
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safeguard. The second line of protection is the defence advocate who can be 
expected to prevent improper evidence or unsupported assertion. A third 
line is the judge who is expected to do the same. In our view these 
safeguards in practice have proved sufficient albeit no system is perfect.”18 
 
The stance of the Bar Council (along with that of the Home Office and CPS on the 
same issue) was described as “complacent”.19 It is perhaps not surprising given the 
voluntary nature of the training identified by the Bar Council as being undertaken by 
members of the Bar in respect of expert evidence that the Report concluded: 
 
“In view of the increasingly important role played by DNA and other forensic 
evidence in criminal investigations, it is wholly inadequate to rely on the 
interest and self-motivation of the legal profession to take advantage of the 
training on offer. We recommend that the Bar make a minimum level of 
training and continuing professional development in forensic evidence 
compulsory.”20 
 
The Report also referred to the “similarly disturbing picture” in respect of the levels 
of training given to judges.21  It comments, “Improving the training given to lawyers 
in the understanding and presentation of forensic evidence should eventually 
produce judges with a more solid understanding of these topics.” In respect of this, 
the Report recommended, particularly in light of the “rapid pace of scientific 
progress” that “judges be given an annual update on scientific developments of 
relevance to the courts”.22   
 
 
                                                        
18 Above n. 2 at 174 
19 Above n.2 at 175 
20 Above n. n.2 at 180 
21 Above, n.2 at 181 
22 Above n.2 at 182 
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The 2005 Report prompted consideration of the issue of the admissibility of expert 
evidence by the Law Commission. In its 2009 Consultation Paper,23 the Commission 
noted that the courts in England and Wales have been reluctant to exclude expert 
evidence on the ground of evidentiary unreliability and have tended to adopt “a 
policy of laissez-faire.”24    The Commission commented, again with particular 
reference to miscarriages of justice including that of Sally Clarke and Angela 
Cannings (also Dallagher and Harris and Others) that, “in short, expert evidence of 
doubtful reliability may be admitted too freely, be challenged too weakly by the 
opposing advocate and be accepted too readily by the jury at the end of the trial.”25 
 
The Commission provisionally proposed the introduction of a statutory admissibility 
test incorporating a reliability limb for expert evidence in criminal proceedings26 The 
Commission was clear, however, that the introduction of a statutory test would not, 
of itself, provide a full solution and identified further measures which would 
complement the introduction of the test and “would solve many of the problems 
associated with expert evidence in criminal proceedings”. Among them was an 
enhanced training curriculum for new judges and junior lawyers which would: 
 
(a) require them to have an understanding of the factors to be borne in mind 
when assessing the viability of a scientific (or purportedly scientific) 
hypothesis; and   
(b) equip them to intervene effectively if an expert witness presents his or 
her evidence in an inappropriate way or strays from his or her legitimate 
field of expertise or provides an opinion predicated on unsound 
assumptions.”27 
 
Specifically, the Report identified particular concerns about the ability or willingness 
of trial advocates to address methodological flaws in cross-examination before 
                                                        
23  Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales, (Law Com 
Consultation No 190, 2009) 
24 ibid at 3.14 
25 ibid at 2.27  
26 ibid at 1.10 
27 ibid at 1.15  
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jurors.28   
Many respondents to the Consultation supported the proposal of enhanced training, 
including the Criminal Bar Association (which advocated specialist training for 
practitioners, the judiciary and experts and enhanced Judicial Studies Board 
directions to provide further safeguards by explaining the limits and potential for 
error in respect of expert evidence) the Law Reform Committee of the Bar (which 
considered that the benefits of training would greatly outweigh the costs), the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission (which was of the opinion that improved training 
of solicitors, counsel and judges could, by itself, go some way towards reducing the 
risk of miscarriages of justice as a result of misleading or inaccurate expert evidence 
and Northumbria University School of Law’s Centre for Evidence and Criminal Justice 
Studies which agreed that the effectiveness of any introduced admissibility test 
would depend upon the ability of counsel to assess, and oppose where appropriate 
the admissibility of expert evidence and the ability the experts who are advising 
them to identify flaws in expert evidence.  
The message is one that is repeated elsewhere. Roberts, points out that in any 
reform of the procedure to determine the admissibility of expert evidence must 
address the problem of ‘the decision-maker’s lack of competence in the matters to 
which the expert proposes to testify’.29  
 
Indeed, numerous academic studies have repeatedly revealed the inconsistent 
performance of the adversarial legal system to advances in science30 along with a 
                                                        
28 ibid. at 2.9 
29 Andrew Roberts, “Drawing on expertise: legal decision-making and the reception of expert 
evidence” (2008) Crim L.R. 6, 443 
30 See for example Gary Edmond et al, “Law’s Looking Glass: Expert Identification Evidence 
Derived from Photographic and Video Images’ (2009) 20 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 337; 
Gary Edmond, Kristy Martire and Mehera San Roque, “Unsound Law: Issues with (‘Expert’) Voice 
Comparison Evidence”, (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 52; Gary Edmond, Matthew 
B Thompson and Jason M Tangen, “A Guide to Interpreting Forensic Testimony: Scientific 
Approaches to Fingerprint Evidence” (2014) Law, Probability and Risk 13.1: 1-25. 
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significant body of case law.31  In relation, specifically to training, Edmond advocates 
“consciousness raising and reconceptualization”32 arguing that: 
 
“The failure of lawyers and judges to have unilaterally recognised these 
problems [with the admission of unreliable expert evidence] suggests that 
trials and appeals have very real limitations when it comes to regulating 
forensic science and medicine evidence… Insufficient attention to the 
reliability of expert evidence and the effectiveness of trial processes means 
that legal institutions are very likely to mismanage incriminating expert 
evidence into the foreseeable future.”33 
 
In its final report the Law Commission recommended the introduction of a statutory 
admissibility test incorporating a reliability limb34 supported by an enhanced training 
regime for the Judiciary and the Bar. The Government declined to legislate, 
(essentially on the basis of cost) and instead invited the Criminal Procedure Rules 
Committee to make amendments to what is now CrimPR19 and is accompanied by 
CrimPD19A, both of which took effect from October 2014.  
 
 
Procedural Reform  
 
Implementation of the Commission’s proposals by way of procedural reform has 
been described as  ‘a novel way of implementing an excellent Report’.35  CrimPR19.2, 
makes clear that an expert’s duty to the court incorporates a duty to give an opinion 
which is objective and unbiased and falls within the expert’s area or areas of 
expertise, a duty to define the expert’s area or areas of expertise and an obligation, 
in giving evidence, to draw the court’s attention to any question to which the answer 
                                                        
31 R v Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 1020; R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1; R v Kai-Whitewind 
[2005] EWCA Crim 1092 and R v Henderson [2010] EWCA Crim 1269. 
32 Gary Edmond, “(Ad)Ministering Justice: Expert Evidence and the Professional Responsibilities 
of Prosecutors” [2013] UNSWLawJl 36, 921 at 921 
33 ibid. at 929 
34 Above, n. 3 at 1.38 and set out in a draft Criminal Evidence (Experts) Bill at Appendix A 
35 See Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, above, n. 6 at 17 
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would be outside the expert’s area or areas of expertise. CrimPR19.4(a) requires 
experts to provide in their reports details of qualifications, relevant experience and 
accreditation. CrimPR19.3(c) now requires an expert who wishes to introduce an 
expert’s evidence other than as an admitted fact to serve with the report notice of 
anything of which the party serving it is aware which might reasonably be thought 
capable of detracting substantially from the credibility of that expert. In addition 
CrimPD19A.1 summarises the common law position that expert opinion evidence is 
admissible in criminal proceedings before 19A.5 and 19A.6 set out, respectively, 
those factors which may be taken into account in determining the reliability of 
expert opinion (particularly expert scientific opinion) and potential flaws which may 
detract from reliability.36 
 
At the time of their introduction, the Lord Chief Justice stated:  
 
“With the changes in the common law that paralleled the Report, the Rules 
and the Practice Direction together with the work undertaken by the 
Advocacy Training Council, the Report has been nearly implemented.”37  
 
The common law changes to which his Lordship referred comprised the principle, 
developed in recent jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal, that ‘in determining the 
issue of admissibility the court must be satisfied that there is a sufficiently reliable 
scientific basis for the evidence to be admitted’38. It is to the application of this 
principle that the guidance provided by CrimPD19A relates. 
 
The question of whether the procedural changes fully reflect the recommendation of 
the Law Commission is considered elsewhere in this special edition.39  However the 
suggestion that the work of the Advocacy Training Council (now the Inns of Court 
College of Advocacy (ICCA)) complement those changes to such an extent that the 
                                                        
36 Appendix 1 
37 Above n. 6 at 17 
38 R v Dlugosz [2013] 1 Cr. App. R. 32 at 11 
39 A. Jackson and M. Stockdale, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Current Challenges and 
Opportunities, forthcoming.  
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Report can be considered to be nearly implemented is one which is discussed here 
as part of a wider question on the extent to which the changes are utilised and are 
making an impact upon daily practice in courts across England and Wales.  
 
 
Northumbria Centre for Evidence and Criminal Justice Studies - Empirical Research  
 
The Northumbria Centre for Evidence and Criminal Justice Studies (NCECJS) 
undertook a national survey of criminal barristers almost one year after the 
introduction of the procedural changes. 51% of respondents indicated that they had 
dealt with 10 or more cases involving expert evidence since October 2014. 30% of 
respondents had no knowledge of the amended Rules or the Practice Direction. Of 
the 70% that were aware, 75% indicated that they were familiar or very familiar with 
them. However, 75% indicated that they had little or no effect on the admissibility of 
expert evidence in the cases they were involved in.  Perhaps even more worryingly, 
56% indicated that they would have no effect on their likelihood to challenge expert 
evidence, or would make it less likely.  
 
The survey invited the respondents to consider each of the 19A.5 factors and asked 
how comfortable they were that they had the adequate training and knowledge to 
make an assessment in relation to each, graded on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 
completely unable and 5 being fully capable.  The average response was 2.  In 
relation to 19A.6 respondents were asked to again grade themselves on how 
comfortable they were that they had adequate training and knowledge to assess 
expert evidence with reference to each of the listed flaws.  The average response 
was 2.5. 
 
That the respondents were not confident with 19A.5 and 19.A.6 factors is perhaps 
not surprising given the scientific nature of some of the assessments to be made. 
Expert evidence is by its very definition outside the experience of non-experts, and 
consequently, it may be that some lawyers are less comfortable and less confident 
when dealing with the reliability of such evidence where that raises issues of a 
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technical nature than they are in dealing with issues such as the competence of 
experts and expert witness bias, which may at times provide fertile ground for cross-
examination without requiring detailed understanding of underlying expert 
methodologies. Certainly that was the overwhelming view expressed by members of 
the Bar in attendance at 2 symposiums held by NCECJS to consider this topic.40 It is 
perhaps no surprise then that an overwhelming 82% of respondents to the survey 
felt that more extensive training was required in order for CrimPR19A and PD19A to 
be fully implemented.  
 
The fact that 30% of those responding to the survey were unaware of the Rule 
changes is disconcerting.  Whilst the survey was relatively small and not sufficiently 
broad to represent a settled national picture, it did draw representation from all 
circuits and from varying duration of Call 41   Whilst it was certainly not 
comprehensive enough to be conclusive it does provide a worrying snapshot which 
suggests that further and more comprehensive empirical research would be justified. 
At the most basic level the Rules and Practice Direction can have no effect if 
practitioners are unaware of them. Also, the survey demonstrated that even those 
criminal practitioners who were aware were not uniformly taking them into account 
or changing the way they approached the admissibility of expert evidence.  There 
certainly appears to be less judicial expectation that counsel are aware of the 
provisions than existed in respect of the bad character and hearsay evidence42 43. 
Whilst these were statutory changes and more fundamentally altered the 
admissibility mechanism for those categories of evidence, this does not, it is 
suggested, fully explain the extent of the apparent lack of engagement, or the 
apparent lack of judicial expectation of advocates in relation to the new provisions. 
                                                        
40 The 2 events were hosted by the Northumbria Centre for Evidence and Criminal Justice 
Studies. The first was a seminar which took place at Northumbria University which was attended 
by members of the local Judiciary and Bar.  The second was a national symposium, which took 
place on 11th September 2015, at Inner Temple and was attended by representatives of many of 
the key bodies involved in the criminal justice system. 
41 The online survey was circulated to members of the Bar of England and Wales via the Circuits 
and the Bar Council. 52 barristers responded. Each of the circuits was represented in those 
responses. 73% declared themselves to be of 15 years call or over. 27% declared themselves to 
be under 15 years call.  
42 A number of comments to this effect were recorded at the 2 symposiums hosted by NCECJS. 
Above,n. 40.  
43 Criminal Justice Act 2003 
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Although there is conflicting debate on the number of contested cases which involve 
scientific evidence44 the Lord Chief Justice pointed out to the Criminal Bar “the vast 
majority of serious cases, and a significant proportion of all Crown Court cases, now 
include presentation of one or more types of forensic evidence.”45   Also notable is 
the almost complete absence of appeals in respect of the new provisions.46 Although 
the reasons for this are impossible to determine precisely, the survey data would 
suggest it is not because the provisions are being applied rigorously, but rather that 
they are rarely being applied at all. This can be contrasted with the numerous 
hearsay and bad character appeals following the introduction of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003’s hearsay and bad character provisions. 
 
Edmond argues that we need to understand why so few judges (and we would add 
advocates) have been attentive to reliability. The Law Commission reported that 
there may have been a culture of acceptance of expert evidence on behalf of some 
trial judges.47 Edmond goes on to propose that: 
 
“… in order for the reforms to achieve the desired ends, there needs to be a 
change in culture and levels of technical sophistication among practising 
lawyers and judges. Lawyers and judges must understand why traditional 
practice is inadequate and be able and willing to change.”48 
 
It is argued that this change in culture can only be achieved through training. The 
reluctance of judges and advocates to address inadequacies in practice is caused by 
lack of knowledge and/or competence, which creates a culture of deference to the 
‘expert’.  Advocates who are armed with the correct knowledge and skills are likely 
                                                        
44 Carr, Piasecki, Tulley and Wilson, “Opening the scientific expert’s black box: ‘critical trust’ as a 
reformative principle in criminal evidence”, forthcoming. 
45 Above, n.6 at 4 
46 The only relevant authority is R (on the application of Wright) v the Crown Prosecution Service 
[2015] EWHC 628 (Admin). 
47 Above, n. 3 at 1.17,  
48Gary Edmond, “Is reliability sufficient? The Law Commission and expert evidence in 
international and interdisciplinary perspective: Part 1, (2012) 16 The International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 30-65 
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to be far more competent to challenge the admissibility and where admitted, the 
weight of evidence before the jury.  
 
 
Current Training  
 
As demonstrated below the provision of training in respect of expert evidence 
remains limited and largely voluntary. Certainly, the clear recommendation from the 
Law Commission that “appropriate training on how to determine evidential 
reliability, particularly in relation to evidence of a scientific nature, should be 
undertaken by all judges and lawyers involved in criminal proceedings”49 appears to 
remain unimplemented.  
 
The Law Commission’s suggestion that “training should also be provided to 
prospective lawyers, newly-qualified lawyers and experienced practitioners” is key to 
a change in culture, as is the idea that the CPD requirements for those who 
undertake criminal work dictate that they attend approved training addressing 
scientific methodology and statistics50 Until expert evidence becomes a fixed and 
expected element of training and professional development it will remain outside 
the comfort zone of many practitioners.  Five years after the Law Commission’s 
Report and two years after the changes to the Criminal Procedure Rules and the 
introduction of the Practice Direction little progress has been made towards this 
aim.  
The training of prospective barristers on the Bar Professional Training Course (BPTC) 
is currently subject to consultation as part of ‘Future Bar Training’, the Bar Standards 
Board’s programme of regulatory change51 and it not yet clear what the future 
holds. However, currently the provision of training in respect of expert evidence 
across the Providers of the BPTC remains fundamentally unchanged. Students 
                                                        
49 Above n.3 at 1.43 
50 Above, n. 3 at 1.43; fn 45 
51< ,https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/qualifying-as-a-barrister/future-bar-training/  > 
accessed  22nd August 2016>  
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receive compulsory knowledge-focused training only in respect of the rules of 
evidence and procedure applicable to expert evidence. Examinable material on the 
use of expert opinion evidence at trial will consist of competence of expert 
witnesses, matters calling for expertise, opinions on ultimate issues, the duty of 
experts and the function and weight of expert evidence.52 There is no requirement 
that students be trained either in basic scientific methodology or statistics, or in 
relation to the advocacy skills required to examine an expert witness. This is perhaps 
understandable historically given that the ‘overarching’ aim of the BPTC is to 
“prepare students of the Inns of Court for pupillage at the Bar”.53  However the use 
of forensic evidence is on the rise and Sir Brian Leveson has indicated that ‘the vast 
majority of serious cases, and a significant proportion of all Crown Court cases, now 
include presentation of one or more types of forensic evidence.’54  Greater training 
on expert evidence at BPTC level is necessary to ensure that there is awareness and 
interaction with the challenges associated with expert evidence from the very start 
of professional education.   If students are familiar with, and trained in respect of, 
expert evidence from the early stages of their career the prospect of such evidence 
being viewed as outwith the advocate’s standard area of expertise decreases and 
with it the potential for developing advocates who are both competent and 
confident in dealing with such evidence increases.  That is the cultural shift required 
to ensure the Bar and Judiciary engage with the complex issues surrounding the 
admissibility and use of expert evidence.  
 
In their educational capacity, the four Inns of Court55 provide training for BPTC 
students, pupils and new practitioners.  All pupils are required to undertake certain 
activities in order for pupillage to be certified as complete and new practitioners 
must attend training under the CPD regime of the New Practitioner Programme.56 
Although there are compulsory elements to both, including an advocacy training 
course in the first 6 months of pupillage and a further advocacy training within the 
                                                        
52 BPTC Handbook, Academic Year 2015/16 at 19 
53 ibid. at 1.2.2 
54 Sir Brian Leverson (2015) Review of the Efficacy in Criminal Proceedings. HMSO: London at 
223 
55 Lincoln’s Inn, Gray’s Inn, Inner Temple and Middle Temple 
56 The New Practitioners Programme operates in the first 3 years of practice 
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first 3 years of practice there is no mandatory requirement that the programmes 
involve any teaching in respect of expert evidence. There is also no mandatory 
training in respect of the general methodology of areas of expertise. This is currently 
a real missed opportunity to ensure that pupils and new practitioners are engaging 
in this notoriously difficult aspect of law. 
 
There are however ongoing developments, The Inns of Court College of Advocacy 
(ICCA)57 are in the process of developing, via the Research and Development 
Committee’s working group on Expert Witnesses “a package of materials to enhance 
the training of advocates” 58  and a guide for handling statistical evidence in 
conjunction with the Royal Statistical Society. This is part of what is described as a 
“wider ATC project on promoting reliability in expert evidence”.59 The guide is due to 
be piloted in the autumn of 2016 (2 years on from the amendments to the CrimPR 
and the introduction of the PD).  
 
In terms of the development of materials to enhance the training of advocates, 
progress has been slow. It appears that the motivation and resources for the 
development of training in this area is very different to those behind, for example, 
the current training programme in respect of the vulnerable (Advocacy and the 
Vulnerable). This national programme developed and delivered by the ICCA in 
response to the Government’s September 2014 paper, ‘Commitment to victims – 
strengthening the protection for victims by making the experience of going to court 
a better one’ will see every practitioner undergo compulsory training in the handling 
of vulnerable witnesses through a national training programme. There is a clear 
implication for those members of the profession who do not undertake the training 
on vulnerable witnesses:  
 
“By March 2015 we will: devise a requirement that to be instructed in cases 
involving serious sexual offences, publicly-funded advocates must have 
                                                        
57 Formerly the Advocacy Training Council  
58 < http://www.advocacytrainingcouncil.org/news-and-events > accessed 2nd July 2016 >  
59 ibid 
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undertaken approved specialist training on working with vulnerable victims 
and witnesses.”60 
 
There is no suggestion there will be a similar requirement in respect of expert 
evidence training nor that any training will be compulsory.  It is suggested that both 
are imperative. 
 
The Lord Chief Justice, the Royal Society and the Royal Society of Edinburgh, on 11th 
April 2016, launched their project to develop a series of ‘primers’ – “standardised 
documents relating to the most popular areas of forensic science, which would 
present the basic science in an accessible, plain English format.” 61  They are 
“designed to assist the judiciary, legal teams and juries when handling scientific 
evidence in the courtroom.”62 DNA analysis is identified as the first area to be 
addressed. In addition seminars are planned for ‘senior judges’ on memory in 
testimony, probability and mental capacity. It is also hoped that training in expert 
methodologies will ultimately feature as part of the Judicial College training calendar 
although there is no date for this. 63 
 
The work of the Inns of Court College of Advocacy is ongoing and the development 
of ‘primers’ is to be welcomed but progress is slow. This is in part understandable 
given the difficulties with funding and the fact that the ICCA has been concentrating 
its efforts on the vulnerable witness programme.  It is also accepted that the 
development of primers is a complex undertaking, even in the more settled areas of 
forensic science. However, the reality is that the Bar are presently no better trained 
in respect of expert evidence than they were prior to 2011. This is the case in 
relation to the fundamentals of the science, the application of the relevant 
procedural rules and the advocacy skills most effective in the presentation and 
challenge of such evidence. There is also concern that the practicalities of the 
                                                        
60<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/354723/c
ommitment-to-victims.pdf  > accessed  22nd August 2016  
61 Above, n. 6 at 44 
62 < https://royalsociety.org/news/2016/04/national-academies-and-the-law-collaborate-to-
provide-better-understanding-of-science-to-the-courts/ > accessed 22nd August 2016   
63 Ibid. 
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application of CrimPR19 and CrimPD19A have not yet been fully considered. In the 
symposiums held by NCECJS, members of the Bar and the Judiciary expressed the 
view that while the procedural rules and practice direction are theoretically very 
useful, they would struggle to find a practical application when cases are not 
effectively managed from the outset with the new provisions in mind, when 
evidence is not disclosed early enough and judges (with a mind-set of austerity and 
strong case management) are not inclined to grant adjournments to allow for more 
detailed consideration of the evidence or a challenge to it.64  
 
It is vital that fundamental, mandatory training for all advocates dealing with expert 
evidence is made available as soon as possible.  Such training should, as a very 
minimum deal with understanding of basic scientific methodologies, the application 
of the Rules and Practice Direction and the advocacy skills needed to effectively 
present and challenge expert evidence during trial. Introductory training should 
feature at BPTC level.  Such early training will inculcate within the profession an 
understanding that dealing with expert evidence is not outside of an advocate’s field 
of expertise but is a fundamental part of the job.  However, as this article will go on 
to argue, for practitioners dealing with expert evidence, training should be much 
more comprehensive than is currently being considered if advocates are truly to 




Proposals for Detailed Training  
 
The concern expressed by the Law Commission (and many of the respondents to its 
Consultation Paper) was the tendency of counsel to cross-examine as to credit and 
the inability or unwillingness to address methodological flaws in cross-examination 
before jurors. The UK Register of Expert Witnesses65 noted in particular the sense 
among their expert respondents that “cross-examination barristers do not 
                                                        
64 Above, n. 40  
65 This Register is now closed. 
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necessarily problem test or challenge expert evidence for its basis in science or 
experience, but instead adopt the simpler approach of trying to undermine the 
expert’s credibility.” 83% of the UK Register of Expert Witnesses’ respondents felt 
that a non-expert advocate faced with an expert who is firm in his or her opinion will 
often try attacking the expert in place of attacking the opinion.66  
 
The Forensic Institute added its view that there should be enhanced training for new 
judges and lawyers. Its Director stated, from his experience as an expert witness, 
“the questions of lawyers and barristers are just not penetrating enough” and yet: 
 
“[t]hey are the one group of people who get to cross-examine forensic 
experts, and ask them how they arrived at their conclusions… [I]t is only 
necessary that the challenger has a knowledge of science, although 
knowledge of the specific discipline is advantageous.” 67  
 
Care must also be taken to ensure that when cross-examination properly moves 
away solely from issues of credibility it does not simply become an unjustified attack 
on the science. A balance must be struck. As the Lord Chief Justice commented:  
 
“With increasingly complex or novel science there comes the risk of 
testing the science, rather than the evidence, in front of the jury. This 
in turns risks undermining juries' and public confidence in forensic 
science, with highly undesirable consequences, resulting either in less 
use of forensic evidence, or less use of juries. So there is a challenge 
for all of us – advocates and judges – to manage the presentation and 
testing of forensic evidence in such a way as to avoid fatally 
undermining confidence.”68  
 
                                                        
66 Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
Consultation No 190, 2009) Summary of Responses to Consultation at 164 
67 Ibid. at 1.526 
68 Above, n.6 at 6 
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So, what is it that advocates should be cross-examining about and how can we train 
them to do this?  To what extent is it really necessary for advocates to be well versed 
in scientific methodology in order to cross-examine expert witnesses? To what 
extent can advocates simply conclude that ‘the expert knows best’?69  The National 
Research Council (NRC of the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS)), concluded 
that: 
 
“With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis … no forensic method has been 
rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree 
of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific 
individual or source…. The simple reality is that the interpretation of forensic 
evidence is not always based on scientific studies to determine its validity. 
This is a serious problem. Although research has been done in some 
disciplines, there is a notable dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies 
establishing the scientific bases and validity of many forensic methods.”70 
 
The NRC report was referenced in two Court of Appeal cases in recent years71 
demonstrating that the issues it highlights are not confined to the US.  Traditionally 
English Courts have had some of the most liberal admissibility practices amongst the 
common law jurisdictions.72  In line with the authors’ own research findings in 
relation to knowledge and use of the Practice Direction, Edmond proposes that in 
reality “relatively few of the findings expressed in the NRC and other reports appear 
to be (well) known to English law”.73  Whilst the development of CrimPD19A 
represents a clear step in the right direction, without the right training, the rule 
changes alone cannot address the key problems identified by the Law Commission.  
The lack of training currently provided to advocates and judges means that many of 
                                                        
69 A question considered in more detail by Carr, Piasecki, Tulley and Wilson, ““Opening the 
scientific expert’s black box: ‘critical trust’ as a reformative principle in criminal evidence”, 
forthcoming. 
70 ‘Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward’, National Research 
Council, 2009, ISBN: 0-309-13131-6 at [8]   
71 Otway v Regina [2011] EWCA Crim 3 and R v Ferdinand [2014] EWCA Crim 1243. 
72 Gary Edmond, “Legal versus non-legal approaches to forensic science evidence”, E. & P. 2016, 
20(1), 3-28 at 5 
73 ibid. at 5 
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the difficulties in relation to the admission of expert evidence remain.  As the Lord 
Chief Justice made plain “the one significant issue that the proper use of the Rules 
and Practice Direction faces is the failure of practitioners to use and refer to them”. 
He continued ‘It is therefore now impossible to see how any advocate can be 
regarded as competent to practice in the criminal courts unless he is familiar with 
the content of the Criminal Procedure Rules and Practice Direction’.74  
  
It is still unclear whether CrimPD19A.4 by stating with reference to the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in Dlugosz that evidence must have a “sufficiently reliable 
scientific basis” was intended to introduce a discrete fourth limb of the common law 
admissibility test or whether the guidance in CrimPD19A on reliability is to be taken 
into account when determining the three traditional limbs of assistance, expertise 
and impartiality.  Jackson and Stockdale considered the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Appeal and suggest:  
 
“Examination of the jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal in combination with 
the fact that the Law Commission had envisaged that the guidance now 
embodied in CrimPD 19A would operate alongside a distinct reliability limb 
and the Lord Chief Justice’s view expressed in his lecture that the common 
law now encompasses a requirement that expert opinion evidence can only 
be admitted if it is reliable, suggests that the Court of Appeal is likely in 
future to treat sufficiency of reliability as a discrete admissibility condition to 
which the guidance in CrimPD 19A is applicable.”75 
 
Whether reliability forms a new fourth limb or not, what is clear, is that the Rules 
and Practice Direction introduced formally, for the first time, guidance on how to 
apply the test of reliability as introduced in case law.  However, as reliability is not 
further defined a test of reliability is still the domain of the common law.76 There is a 
real risk that without significant training, even with the PD19A.5 and 19A.6 factors 
                                                        
74 Lord Thomas (2015) The Criminal Procedure Rules: 10 years on. Criminal Law Review 6, 395 
75 See Jackson and Stockdale, above n.39 
76 Tony Ward, “A new and more rigorous approach to expert evidence in England and Wales” The 
International Journal of Evidence & Proof (2015): 1365712715591471. 
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the question of reliability will be approached in the same way that it always has 
been. Indeed it may be that counsel will continue to focus on the easy targets of 
expert witness competence and bias rather than delving into the more challenging 
issue of reliability of expert methodologies or techniques.  
 
 Even where the issue of the reliability of expert evidence is raised, traditionally 
whether a technique is reliable tends to be assessed only on whether the technique 
is grounded in mainstream science and not at the actual validity of the technique 
itself.77  Assessing the validity of a technique should require consideration of 
whether sufficient research has been undertaken to make a credible assessment of 
whether it works, how well and in what conditions.78  When advocates fail to do this 
and concentrate only on whether the technique is known they do little to direct 
attention to the scientific understanding of reliability and instead focus on “a 
peculiar legal construction [of reliability] that excuses the failure to have undertaken 
appropriate research and testing because of the confidence vested in adversarial 
forensic techniques.”79  There is a string of English case law examples prior to the 
introduction of the Practice Direction, which demonstrate how weak the reliability 
requirement has been in practice80 and a failure to deal properly with reliability 
means there is a risk the jury will demonstrate unjustified deference in respect of 
core aspects of their task.81 
 
Edmond argues cogently that: 
 
“Legal reliability is closely aligned with bare relevance (i.e. the opinion seems 
probative) and proxies such as the existence of a field, the analyst's training, 
study or experience, and perceived assistance or need. Generally, courts have 
                                                        
77  David S Caudill, “Lawyers Judging Experts: Oversimplifying Science and Undervaluing 
Advocacy to Construct an Ethical Duty?” (2011) 38 Pepperdine Law Review 675 
78 See Edmond, above, n. 72 at 11 
79 Above n. 72 at 12 
80 For example see; Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260; R v Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 195; R v 
Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161; R v Luttrell and others [2004] EWCA Crim 1344; Gilfoyle [2001] 2 
Cr App R 5; Otway[2011] EWCA crim 3; Weighman [2011] EWCA  Crim 2826 
81 Tony Ward, “Usurping the role of the jury? Expert evidence and witness credibility in English 
criminal trials”, The International Journal of evidence and Proof (2009) 13(2), 83-101 
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been unreceptive to the need for evidence of validity and reliability. 
Ordinarily, to the extent that they are addressed, issues of validity and 
reliability are to be resolved through the trial (via cross-examination, rebuttal 
witnesses and judicial guidance) and in exceptional cases through the 
application of PACE s.78.”82 
 
Liberal admission of expert evidence was based upon the concept that the 
adversarial trial will provide the appropriate forum for scrutinising and evaluating 
expert evidence. The belief was that good cross-examination will highlight 
comprehensively weaknesses in the evidence which can then be assessed through 
the burden and standard of proof.83  This is highlighted to best effect in Atkins where 
it was specifically stated that the methodological limitations with facial mapping 
evidence were issues for trial: 
 
“The absence of a statistical database is something which will undoubtedly 
be exposed in cross-examination. The witness may expect to be asked to 
explain how, if no-one knows how often ears or noses of the shape relied 
upon appear in the population at large, it is possible to say anything at all 
about the significance of the match; his answers may be satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory but will be there to be evaluated by the jury, which will have 
been reminded by the judge that any expert's expression of opinion is that 
and no more and does not mean that he is necessarily right. Similarly, the 
expert may be expected to be tested upon the extent to which he has not 
only looked for similarities, but has actively sought out dissimilarities. Those 
are but the simplest of the questions which plainly need to be asked of 
anyone offering evidence of this kind. Cross examination will also be 
informed by the fullest disclosure of his method, generally, and of his 
working notes in the particular case being tried.”84 
 
                                                        
82 Above n. 48 at 14 
83 n.48 at 50 
84 R v. Atkins and Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 at 28 
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In reality, some of these basic questions were not dealt with at trial.85 If the case of 
Atkins had been heard after the implementation of the Practice Direction Counsel 
should have had regard to PD19A.5 and 19A.6 and this may have helped to identify 
some of the issues raised above.   However, the Practice Direction can only be of use 
if an advocate fully understands that, for example, in assessing validity of the 
method used (highlighted in PD19A.5(a)) an expert should be able to ascertain the 
error rate and level of uncertainty associated with a specific technique.86 It is argued 
that reference to the Practice Direction alone is unlikely to ensure an advocate is 
able to identify the right issues or formulate the right questions without further 
training.  To be able to understand and apply the Practice Direction training needs 
to, as a minimum, help advocates: 
 
-  understand the importance of validation studies 
- understand probative value through ascertaining the error rate and level of 
uncertainty associated with a specific technique 
- understand the limits of expertise and/or proficiency 
- know how to find the standards or protocols that should have been complied 
with 
- ensure the way an expert expresses his opinion is actually consistent with the 
results of the validation studies 
- identify potential contextual bias 
- understand whether the expert has shown how their results can be verified 
- know how to look for multidisciplinary perspectives particularly when dealing 
with an expert from a small scientifically marginal or emerging field  
- ensure any expert report or testimony is transparent and comprehensive87 
enough and has given full and frank disclosure.88   
                                                        
85 Edmond G, Kemp R, Porter G, et al. “Atkins v The Emperor: The "cautious” use of unreliable 
"expert” opinion.” Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 14 (2010): 146. 
86 n. 32  
87 Tim Wilson, Michael  Stockdale, Angela Gallop and Bill Lawler,  “Regularising the Regulator: the 
Government’s Consultation about Placing the Forensic Science Regulator on a Statutory Footing”, 
The Journal of Criminal Law (2014) 78 JCL 136–163 at [142-148] 
88 For a detailed discussion of these areas see Gary Edmond, “Legal versus non-legal approaches 
to forensic science evidence” E. & P. 2016, 20(1), 3-28 at [20 – 22] 
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Whilst the Practice Direction is designed to help advocates move away from 
attacking only an expert’s CV to actually addressing the key issues of reliability it is 
argued that advocates need training to be able to fully understand and implement 
the guidance provided by 19A.5 and 19A.6 so that they appreciate, for example, the 
types of validation studies that should be available and, ideally, included in the 
expert’s report.89 They need to be able to understand how to evaluate whether the 
expert has the actual expertise to do the specific task on which his opinion is based.  
This is increasingly important in light of the de-skilling of many forensic scientists as 
the age of austerity takes its full grip on the criminal justice system.90   
 
As has been demonstrated above this sort of training is currently not available.  
Without it the Rules and the Practice Direction are a blunt tool which are capable of 
driving a limited amount of change in how expert evidence is dealt with on a day to 
day basis. Ultimately, if the judge and advocates do not ensure that the jury know 
whether an expert can do what they say they can and/or how well they can do it the 
expert’s opinion may potentially mislead the court, usually to the detriment of the 
Defendant. It is accepted that judges and advocates may often deal with expert 
evidence in an exemplary way. Without the introduction of systematic training 
throughout the profession, however, there is a significant risk that the adversarial 
system is not consistently identifying and clearly demonstrating the limitations of 
expert evidence to the court.  This cannot be a satisfactory position. The Law 
Commission ultimately chose to place significant confidence in quite limited training 





                                                        
89 Whilst Crim PR 19.4(h) require an expert’s report to include “such information as the court 
may need to decide whether the expert’s opinion is sufficiently reliable to be admissible as 
evidence” it is unclear whether this will be interpreted to include validation studies.    
90 Maguire, M., Noaks, L., Hobbs, R. and Brearley, N. (1991) Assessing Investigative Performance. 
Cardiff: School of Social and Administrative Studies, University of Wales at [25] 




Even when the Practice Direction criteria have been used to assist the court to 
determine admissibility at common law and the court has ruled such evidence to be 
admissible, counsel will still be entitled to challenge the weight of such evidence 
before the jury and the jury will need to understand the evidence, how it should be 
used to inform their decision-making and the factors which may contribute to their 
assessment of its evidential weight. The Practice Direction gives no guidance as to 
how evidence should be presented to the jury once admitted but training will equip 
advocates and the judiciary with the skills needed to ensure evidence is correctly 
presented. For example, it would be wrong to allow the jury to apply any weight it 
wants to the evidence if there are validation studies and indicative error rates which 
can demonstrate how much weight can legitimately be given to a piece of 
evidence.92  Poor presentation of evidence in court can be very damaging.  If the jury 
cannot appreciate the limitations of a technique relied upon by a prosecution expert 
or if appropriate terminology is used then the benefit the defendant has via the 
criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt may be lost.  
 
Edmond, Martire, Kemp and others considered within the Australian context how 
lawyers should approach the cross-examination of expert witnesses with specific 
focus on forensic scientists.93  They concluded that the primary failing of lawyers 
when cross-examining experts is their inability to deal with validity and reliability. 
Too often lawyers deal with “legal admissibility heuristics” 94  such as field, 
qualifications, experience, common knowledge, previous rejection of the witness’ 
evidence etc.  Concentrating on attacking the CV of the witness at the expense of 
validity and reliability means that the jury are deprived of the information they really 
need; understanding of actual ability and accuracy of the evidence presented. 
 
“Too often, issues central to the assessment of scientific validity and 
reliability (and therefore probative value) have been circumvented by 
                                                        
92 Above, n.32 at [941] 
93 Gary Edmond, Kirsty Martire, Richard Kemp et al., “How to Cross-Examine Forensic Scientists: 
A Guide for lawyers” (2014) 39 Aust Bar Rev 174 
94 ibid. at 174 
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recourse to experience, formal qualifications, previous appearances in legal 
proceedings, previous involvement in investigations and convictions, the 
practice or jurisprudence in other jurisdictions, and the institutional practices 
and polices of police forces and forensic science institutions. These 
substituted factors may not however, provide actual evidence for the validity 
and reliability of techniques and derivative opinions, for, they do not provide 
independent evidence, or an actual guarantee, that a technique or method 
has probative value.”95 
 
In addition to understanding the scientific issues which underpin reliability advocates 
must also be able to ask the right questions in court. Edmond et al provide examples 
of cross-examination questions that deal with relevance and validation and consider 
how lawyers “can unpack whether or not the evidence can rationally influence the 
assessment of facts in issue”.96  Specific advocacy training is vital for all defence and 
prosecution advocates. The current training and CPD regime for the Bar do not 
prepare practitioners to undertake such nuanced cross-examination. It is unrealistic 
to believe that this is a skill which will inherently be ‘picked-up’ along the way. Just 
as there is now an understanding that advocates must have extensive training in 
handling vulnerable witnesses, such training is also needed in relation to expert 
evidence and it is suggested that such training should be just as expansive and 





Whist great trust has been placed on the adversarial system as a trial safeguard97 a 
significant body of case law would suggest that this trust has been misplaced.98   The 
case of Sally Clark perhaps most poignantly demonstrated the consequences for the 
                                                        
95 ibid.  at pg 175 
96 Above, n.93 at pg 177 
97 Above, n.72 at pg 11  
98R v Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 1020; R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1; R v Kai-Whitewind 
[2005] EWCA Crim 1092 and R v Henderson [2010] EWCA Crim 1269.  
 27 
victim of the miscarriage of justice of failure to deal adequately with expert evidence 
during a trial. The 2005 report ‘Forensic Science on Trial’ and the Law Commission’s 
2011 Report clearly highlighted the ”laissez faire” attitude of the Bar and the 
Judiciary to both the admissibility of expert evidence and the need for further 
training in respect of it.    This article has attempted to demonstrate that it is now 
difficult to argue that any advocate can be regarded as competent to practice in the 
criminal courts of England and Wales unless he is at the most basic level familiar with 
the content of the Criminal Procedure Rules and Practice Direction in relation to 
expert evidence. A substantial cultural change to tackle the complacency first 
identified by the Select Committee in 2005 can only be achieved through training.  
Greater training for the legal profession has been advocated for over 10 years but 
we are yet to see any mandatory minimum level of training in this area.   There is 
little evidence that in day to day practice much has changed since the Law 
Commission concluded that “expert evidence of doubtful reliability may be admitted 
too freely, challenged too weakly by the opposing advocates and be accepted too 
readily by the jury at the end of the trial.”99 
 
Whilst the Rules and new Practice Direction are an important and welcome initiative, 
the survey reported in this article provides a snapshot view of an unaltered approach 
to expert evidence in daily practice of courts across England and Wales.  Although 
the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee will do all it can to encourage the use of the 
Rules and the Practice Direction and a proper understanding of them, it is plainly the 
responsibility of practitioners to put behind them the culture that addressing the 
validity and reliability of expert evidence is outside of their remit.  There is evidence 
of a lack of engagement with the Rules and Practice Direction though the cause of 
this cannot be clearly ascertained. The almost complete absence of appeals in 
respect of these new provisions along with the results of the survey suggests that 
the Rules and Practice Direction may not be being applied appropriately. Urgent 
training is needed to ensure practitioners are aware of the Rules and have resources 
                                                        
99 n. 23 at 2.27 
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available to them to help understand CrimPD19 to ensure that they are able to fully 
address reliability when assessing admissibility and when presenting evidence to the 
court.  
It is suggested that training should start at the BPTC stage.  The fact that there is no 
requirement for students to be trained either in basic scientific methodology or 
statistics or in relation to the advocacy skills required to examine an expert is a flaw 
in the current training system for barristers.  Whilst such training would need to be 
pitched at the right level and designed to fit within what is already a very intense 
programme, it is vital that we introduce emerging advocates to the challenges 
associated with expert evidence from the very start of their careers so that they 
understand that dealing with these issues is central to an advocates job and not an 
appendage to it to be considered at a later date. Such training during the BPTC, 
pupillage and practice will deliver the culture change required within the profession 
so that members of the Bar and Judiciary are required and motivated to engage and 
have the skills and knowledge base they need to do so. Unfortunately, this article 
has demonstrated that whilst some progress is being made the motivation and 
resources do not yet seem to be fully in place. There should be a similar impetus and 
resource allocation in relation to expert evidence as can currently be seen in relation 
to vulnerable witnesses.   
It is now seems clear that reliability is central to the question of admissibility of 
expert evidence. However, there remains a real risk that without significant training, 
even with the PD19A.5 and 19A.6 factors, challenges to expert evidence will be 
approached by attacking whether the science is ‘mainstream’ or on the basis of the 
witnesses’ credibility.  Both techniques fail to appropriately address validity and 
reliability. It is clear that whilst PD19A.5 and 19A.6 are incredibly helpful to direct the 
mind of the advocate, without more detailed training than currently considered the 
criteria cannot be fully understood. Without a significant increase of pace in terms of 
training and a greater engagement with the practical application of the Rules and 
Practice Direction, it appears unlikely that the Rule changes and Practice Direction 
will have the impact envisaged. Progress in relation to training has been remarkably 
and inextricably slow but the pace must increase if further miscarriages of justice are 
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Figure 1, Criminal Practice Direction 19A.1 
 
Figure 2, Criminal Practice Direction 19A.5 
 
Figure 3, Criminal Practice Direction 19A.6 
 
 
 
